For a vulnerability instance, two builds of the same software are prepared: vulnerable (bā») and patched (bāŗ). A candidate input x is executed on both builds under sanitizer instrumentation. The oracle accepts x as a valid PoC only if bā» triggers the target sanitizer failure and bāŗ does not. Because the predicate is programmatic and decidable, an agent can test each candidate without supervision; the verdict together with the sanitizer trace provides grounded feedback, turning PoC construction into an executable proposeāverifyārefine loop.
How to objectively and without human supervision decide whether a model-generated exploit/PoC genuinely triggers a given vulnerability rather than crashing for an incidental reason.
The vulnerable version of the software on which a valid PoC must trigger a crash.
The patched version on which a valid PoC must NOT trigger a crash.
Crash(b,x) is true iff executing b on x triggers the target sanitizer failure; provides the signal for memory errors.
š±(x)=š[Crash(bā»,x)]ā§š[¬Crash(bāŗ,x)] ā a machine-checkable success signal.
The principle of comparing program variants' behavior on identical inputs as an oracle.
A two-sided, machine-checkable differential oracle (pre/post-patch builds) for autonomous PoC generation by AI agents.
The sanitizer instrumentation type defining the Crash predicate (e.g. memory-error detection).